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ILLUMINATING JUSTICE MARSHALL'S DEATH PENALTY
JURISPRUDENCE VIA THE PRISM OF
DYNAMIC CONSTITUTIONALISM
Saby Ghoshray*
In recognizing the humanity of our fellow beings, we pay
ourselves the highest tribute.
- Furman v. Georgia (Marshall, J., concurring)
I. INTRODUCTION
As we enter the centennial anniversary of Justice Thurgood Marshall's
birth, history is beginning to drift away from Marshall's substantive contri-
bution to American Constitutional jurisprudence. At a time in American
constitutional history when the jurisprudence is slipping away from the
Marshallian ideals anchored in an expanded abstraction of law, manifested
by recent jurisprudential developments in civil liberties' and death penalty
issues,2 revisiting Marshall's legacy is vitally important. Against this back-
drop, I shall respectfully pen my tribute to Marshall's jurisprudential phi-
losophy with a view to establish that Marshall's equality conception can
best be judged through the interpretive gloss of dynamic constitutionalism,3
* Dr. Ghoshray has been a prolific researcher in multi-faceted disciplines, investigating issues
from cross-cultural perspectives. His work has appeared in Albany Law Review, ILSA Journal of
International and Comparative Law, European Law Journal ERA-Forum, Toledo Law Review, Temple
Political & Civil Rights Law Review, Catholic Law Journal, Georgetown International Law Review, and
Fordham International Law Journal, among others. Dr. Ghoshray's main scholarship interest is in
search for equality in the legal process, looking through the prism of gender, class and ethnicity. This is
echoed in his work on diverse subsets of international law, comparative constitutionalism, death penalty
jurisprudence, law & religion, gender & law, among others. The author would like to thank Jennifer
Schulke for her assistance in legal research and typing of the manuscript. To Shreyoshi and Sayantan,
your support is endless. Warm thanks go to the members of the Mississippi College Law Review
Editorial Board, especially Todd Butler for his interest and support during the editorial process. Dr.
Ghoshray can be reached at sabyghoshray@sbcglobal.net.
1. See generally Saby Ghoshray, Untangling The Legal Paradigm of Indefinite Detention: Secur-
ity, Liberty and False Dichotomy in the Aftermath of 9/11, 19 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 249, 270 (2006)
(discussing the recent curtailment of civil liberty of citizens by the Bush Administration's War on Terror
and offering differing viewpoints on the issue).
2. See generally Saby Ghoshray, Tracing the Moral Contours of the Evolving Standards of De-
cency: The Supreme Court's Capital Jurisprudence Post-Roper, 45 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 561 (2006)
(highlighting various viewpoints and recent developments in death penalty jurisprudence post-Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)).
3. By referring to a dynamic Constitution, attention is drawn to the process by which the Con-
stitution adapts to the changing conditions in the society. As the frontiers of the freedom of speech, the
freedom of religion, the rights to privacy and sexual practices among consenting adults continue to
expand within the meaning of our Constitution, we are confronted with its dynamic aspect. In most
parlance, the phrases "dynamic Constitution" and "living Constitution" are used synonymously. See
generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 3-4 (2001) (explaining that the
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perhaps an area of his jurisprudence that has not been the subject of much
scholarly discussion.
Justice Marshall's jurisprudence was built on his conception of equal-
ity-equality he found elusive in the lives of impoverished African Ameri-
cans during his legal career. Thus, as a firsthand witness of the segregated
minority's disenfranchisement, Marshall allowed these life experiences to
shape his jurisprudence into a relentless pursuit of equality in the legal pro-
cess. This struggle for equality prompted Marshall to extricate substantive
justice from its formal procedural counterpart. Perched on this illuminated
vision of substantive justice was built perhaps the most profound legacy of
Marshall-his embrace of a dynamic interpretation of the Constitution.
This interpretation was animated by the aspiration set forth in the Declara-
tion of Independence, while transcending law into a value-centric justice
mechanism4 and along the way, paving a more attainable road to equality
for future generations. During his time on the Court, Marshall sought to
achieve this goal by dismantling legal barriers through his powerful dissents
and concurring opinions, as well as his writings for the majority.
As I contemplate Marshall's jurisprudence for posterity, I am con-
fronted by his contributions in civil rights,5 free expression,6 poverty law,7
Constitution provides principles that the Court identifies and implements "through a highly moralized,
philosophic inquiry").
4. By "value-centric justice mechanism," I draw attention to the framework which derives its
fundamentals from the recognition that, every individual within a society is capable of imparting value,
which calls for an analysis of economic trade-off between lengthy incarceration and parole-probation. I
have examined this concept of value-centric punishment mechanism in my forthcoming work, Saby
Ghoshray, America the Prison Nation: Melding Humanistic Jurisprudence with a Value-Centric Incar-
ceration Model, NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIv. CONFINEMENT (forthcoming 2008).
5. See Rhode, infra note 35.
6. Justice Marshall wrote a number of pioneering decisions for the Supreme Court, which bol-
sters, in unmistakable terms, an individual's right to privacy. In Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565
(1969), the Court ruled that states cannot criminalize possession of pornographic material within one's
private dwelling. Justice Marshall illuminated the meaning of the First Amendment stating:
[W]e do not think [statutes regulating obscenity] reach into the privacy of one's own home. If
the First Amendment means anything, it means that a state has no business telling a man,
sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch. Our
whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control
men's minds.
Id. Similarly in Police Department of the City of Chicago v. Moseley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972) (internal
citations omitted), Marshall declared a city ordinance in violation of the Constitution because:
[Tlhe First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of
its message its ideas, its subject matter, or its content. To permit the continued building of our
politics and culture, and to assure self-fulfillment for each individual, our people are guaran-
teed the right to express any thought, free from government censorship.
7. Marshall's greatest contribution to the Supreme Court was his powerful dissents, an array of
which illuminated his conception of how law should treat poor people. While his colleagues in the
Court, in most cases, refrained from providing relief to individuals disabled by impoverishment, Justice
Marshall saw this as the majority's mistreatment of the poor. In United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 459-
60 (1973) (internal citations omitted), while the majority upheld the constitutionality of the filing fee
requirement, Marshall unleashed a strong dissent:
"I cannot agree with the majority that it is so easy for the desperately poor to save $1.92 each
week over the course of six months. The 1970 census found that over 800,000 families in the
Nation had annual incomes of less than $1,000, or $19.23 a week. I see no reason to require
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and death penalty.8 Mostly, however, I am drawn to his juridical objective
of abolishing the death penalty, a commitment in which he never wavered.
His death penalty jurisprudence is revealed through his relentless dissents,
speeches, and court briefs, and developed through his half-century of work
towards abolishment in the future. He espoused the belief that the death
penalty is cruel and unusual punishment and thus, violative of the Constitu-
tion's Eighth Amendment. This belief emanated from his deep conviction
in the essence of human morality and ethics.9 His unflinching commitment
to restoring equality within the legal process made it untenable to accept
the arbitrariness with which capital sentencing is disbursed in the U.S. ° I
seek to illuminate Justice Marshall's death penalty jurisprudence through
two distinct threads. In the first, I draw attention to Marshall's view of
dynamic constitutionalism to illustrate how this interpretive technique is
consistent with his abolishment position. In the second, I examine how
Marshall's interpretation of the Eighth Amendment's "cruel and unusual"
that families in such straits sacrifice over 5% of their annual income as a prerequisite to get-
ting a discharge in bankruptcy.
8. See Tracy B. Fitzpatrick, Justice Thurgood Marshall and Capital Punishment: Social Justice
and the Rule of Law, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1065, 1065-86 (1995).
9. In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 343-58 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring), Justice Mar-
shall analyzed the social purposes for the imposition of the death penalty: retribution, deterrence, recid-
ivism, eugenics, economy, and encouraging guilty pleas and confessions. See also Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 236-42 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (discussing the concepts of retribution and deterrence
and their relationship to capital punishment). He systematically considered and eliminated each one of
them. First, he eliminated retribution by itself as a legitimate penological objective, contending: "[T]he
Eighth Amendment itself was adopted to prevent punishment from becoming synonymous with ven-
geance." Furman, 408 U.S. at 343 (Marshall, J., concurring). Second, he rejected arguments that the
death penalty is a necessary deterrent to crime in society. Citing research, and supporting the idea that
the death penalty is no more effective a deterrent than life imprisonment, Justice Marshall asserted that
"[i]n light of the massive amount of evidence before us, I see no alternative but to conclude that capital
punishment cannot be justified on the basis of its deterrent effect." Id. at 345-54. Third, Marshall ex-
amined evidence contending that convicted murderers rarely commit murder again even if they are not
sentenced to die. See id. at 355. Next, Justice Marshall established the economic argument that the
death penalty is more expensive than life imprisonment. See id. at 358. Additionally, he felt the leverage
used by the invocation of the death penalty to encourage guilty pleas and confessions is morally repug-
nant and a violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. This led him to believe
that life imprisonment is penologically sufficient as it "can be used as leverage for bargaining for pleas
or confessions in exchange either for charges of lesser offenses or recommendations of leniency." Id. at
356 (discussing Justice Marshall's abolitionist position). For a more comprehensive discussion of the
Justice Marshall's objections to capital punishment, see MICHAEL MELLO, AGAINST THE DEATH PEN-
ALTY: THE RELENTLESS DISSENTS OF JUSTICES BRENNAN AND MARSHALL, 11-13, 143-44, 182-84,
187-89 (Northeastern University Press 1996).
10. To better understand the arbitrariness and capricious nature of the death penalty I have
relied on general sources such as: Samuel R. Gross, Still Unfair, Still Arbitrary - But Do We Care?,
Keynote Address, in 26 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 517 (2000); Ben Steiner, Still Arbitrary: Capital Sentencing
in the Post-Furman Era, 10 CRIM. JUST. POL'Y REV. 85 (1999); Amnesty International, The Death Pen-
alty is Arbitrary and Unfair, http://www.amnestyusa.org/abolish/arbitraryandunfair.html; Michael Burk-
head and James Luginbuhl, Sources of Bias and Arbitrariness in the Capital Trial, 50 J. Soc. ISSUES 103
(1994); Ronald J. Tabak, The Death of Fairness: The Arbitrary and Capricious Imposition of the Death
Penalty in the 1980s, 14 REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 797 (1986); David Baldus, et al., Arbitrariness And
Discrimination In The Administration Of The Death Penalty: A Challenge To State Supreme Court, 15
STETSON L. REV. 133 (1986); John Blume, Theodore Eisenberg, and Martin T. Wells, Explaining Death
Row's Population and Racial Composition, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD., 165-207 (2004); American
Civil Liberties Union, Scattered Justice: Geographic Disparities of the Death Penalty, March 5, 2004,
http://www.aclu.org/capita/unequal/10532pub2004O3O5.html.
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doctrine stems from his vision of morality, extracted from the deeper con-
fines of society's evolving standards of decency. Drawing upon these two
apparently discordant threads, I trace the constitutional contours of Mar-
shall's "death-is-different" jurisprudence to establish that his death penalty
jurisprudence is an extension of his equality conception.
Although Marshall envisioned the emancipation of downtrodden mi-
norities through the legal process, he did not believe in the Constitution's
original intent. To him, the framers' intent was not consistent with the di-
rection of social change required to bring about equality in the legal pro-
cess. Marshall saw the promise of social change through legal process only
within his view of dynamic constitutionalism, a viewpoint that might seem
inconsistent with Marshall's professed allegiance to established legal pro-
cess. In my view, embracing dynamic constitutionalism does not attenuate
Marshall's fidelity to rule of law. Rather, it provides a window through
which to interpret his conception of equality and liberty. And it is within
these doctrines that he sought to bring equality in the legal process."'
Through his adherence to these normative components buried in the Con-
stitutional texts, Marshall set forth a jurisprudential goal to bring substan-
tive equality to the legal process. His substantive equality differs from
"genuine equality"12 in that his equality does not seek equal outcome.
Rather, it places reliance on access to the legal process for all people so
that equitable legal outcomes can be achieved by all.
Marshall's recognition of the evolving nature of the Constitution can
be viewed through his steadfast belief in a more malleable interpretation,
rather than perhaps what was intended by the framers, especially in race
relations and social justice. To him, the Constitution was made for all the
people and was to be given life and substance via the aspirations and will of
all. He believed that deep in the bosom of the indeterminate texts of the
constitutional statutes, there is a promise of fairness and equality to those
victimized by discrimination.13 This very conception of equality shaped his
view of the original intent. Therefore, constitutional interpretation must
not rely on precedents, especially when it cannot address societal problems
11. See Cass R. Sunstein, On Marshall's Conception of Equality, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1267-75
(1992).
12. This term appeared in Marshall's opinion in Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 398 (1978).
13. Marshall's commitment to equal opportunity for all people came through his early cases, in
which he challenged the practice of applying second-class citizen in children, as he responded to Justice
Reed's question in his argument in Brown:
I know in the South where I spend most of my time, you will see white and colored kids going
down the road together to school. They separate and go to different schools, and they come
out and play together. I do not see why there would necessarily be any trouble if they went to
school together.
Oral Argument, Briggs v. Elliot (Dec. 10, 1952) (companion case to Brown) in 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS
AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 345-46
(Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975).
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stemming from the inequality found in the darkest recesses of human na-
ture and reveals itself through bigotry, hatred, and selfishness.14 Therefore,
Marshall's fidelity to the Constitution comes from his recognition of the
need for a flexible legal process that would seek to maximize social equality
for every citizen.
Besides allegiance to an evolving constitutionalism, Marshall's concep-
tion of equality can be traced to his viewpoint of morality. 5 I have no
doubt that this morality prism will further irradiate Marshall's conception
of equality for reasons I shall highlight in this article. The moral compass
Marshall uses is illuminated by an evolving conception of civilized human-
ity, which is a far cry from the hackneyed ideals of morality that flow from
the strict religious connotations of Puritanism. His morality must be viewed
through the lenses of societal evolution, where all societal changes are
prompted vis-A-vis enlightenment in social understanding. According to
this view, the death penalty is a barbaric punishment mechanism,
originated in the early medieval days, more for the purpose of vengeance
and retribution, and less aimed at achieving deterrence.
With the evolution of society, however, the threshold of human de-
cency must be elevated, allowing the advancement to be measured. Mar-
shall contended that by correcting the moral compass of the society,
humanity can achieve this elevated threshold of decency.' 6 Thus, if we mea-
sure this evolving standard of decency, not only can we inculcate a newer
dimension to morality, but also can recognize the death penalty's cruel and
unusual elements, which will automatically render such punishment prohib-
ited under the Eighth Amendment.
Therefore, this short monograph will be constructed in three parts. In
Part II, by going through Marshall's speeches, concurrences and dissenting
opinions, I will draw an analysis of his view of dynamic constitutionalism.
14. Marshall saw the Constitution as an evolving document, which acquired newer meaning with
various Amendments along its two-hundred years of journey from birth. As a result, Marshall did not
believe in the original meaning of the Constitution, as seen through his multiple opinions and speeches.
While rejecting the notion of caste-like barriers in the society, Marshall observed, "[t]he intent of the
Fourteenth Amendment was to abolish caste legislation. When state action has the predictable ten-
dency to entrap the poor and create a permanent underclass, that intent is frustrated." Kadrmas v.
Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 469 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
15. Morality takes an important stage in Marshall's jurisprudence. Justice Marshall used moral
discourse in establishing the legal validity of his abolitionist position in several instances during his
Furman opinion. According to him, the death penalty "violates the Eighth Amendment because it is
morally unacceptable to the people of the United States at this time in their history." Furman v. Geor-
gia, 408 U.S. 238, 360 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring). Marshall further noted that a punishment is
morally acceptable "unless 'it shocks the conscience and sense of justice of the people.' " Id. (quoting
United States v. Rosenberg. 195 F.2d 583, 608 (2d Cir. 1952)) (footnote omitted). Justice Marshall then
concluded that, by abolishing the death penalty, "[w]e achieve 'a major milestone in the long road up
from barbarism' and join the approximately 70 other jurisdictions in the world which celebrate their
regard for civilization and humanity by shunning capital punishment." Id. at 371 (quoting RAMSEY
CLARK, CRIME IN AMERICA 336 (1970)) (footnotes omitted).
16. By threshold of decency, I draw attention to a measuring stick by which humanity's progress
with respect of acquiring traits of civility or decency can be measured. The concept of decency or evolv-
ing standards of decency has been further elaborated. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 71 (1973).
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In Part III, I will expand upon the morality-centric jurisprudence of Justice
Marshall and explain how the morality and the evolving standard of de-
cency must be viewed together. This will lead to an in-depth look at Mar-
shall's death penalty jurisprudence and how it matured through his
invocation of dynamic constitutionalism and his imparting morality in the
death penalty discourse. Along the way, I will analyze Marshall's death
penalty jurisprudence through his view of the Eighth Amendment, dy-
namic constitutionalism, evolving standards of decency, and finally the mo-
rality of the death penalty.
II. DYNAMIC CONSTITUTIONALISM OF JUSTICE MARSHALL
Justice Marshall's allegiance to living constitutionalism is not as widely
publicized as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes' affinity for a living Constitu-
tion.17 Neither is Justice Marshall known for his uncompromising affection
for originalism as Justice Scalia. t" Marshall's embrace of living constitution-
alism, manifested via the chain of causation he provides in his constitu-
tional interpretation, is used to show support for his abolishment principle.
Marshall rejected the judicial method of the death penalty on the grounds
that validation of the death penalty relies predominantly upon de facto im-
plementation of the Court's legal rulings. These rulings base their doctrinal
support on the Court's adherence to historical precedent. Thus, according
to Marshall, precedential rulings may not illuminate the particularized
complexities of an emerging situation. This may cause reason to be buried
under the inflexibilities of precedent,19 an outcome not conducive to equi-
table legal process. Over reliance on precedent, without careful analysis of
17. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes is one of the early proponents of an evolving, living Constitu-
tion. "Oliver Wendell Holmes, ha[s] always insisted that the strength and vitality of the Constitution
stem from the fact that its principles are adaptable to changing events." Vreeland v. Byrne, 370 A.2d
825, 845 n.9 (N.J. 1977) (citing ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: A
STUDY OF A CRISIS IN AMERICAN POWER POLITICS 174 (1941)). According to Justice Holmes, constitu-
tional development "could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters. It was
enough for them to realize or to hope that they had created an organism .. " Missouri v. Holland, 252
U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
18. Justice Scalia acknowledges that his textualist approach is regarded in "some sophisticated
circles" of the legal profession as "simpleminded-'wooden,' 'unimaginative,' 'pedestrian."' Antonin
Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Inter-
preting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
3, 38 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). He rejected this characterization and denied that he was "too dull to
perceive the broader social purposes that a statute is designed, or could be designed, to serve." Id.
Justice Scalia insisted that the Justices "have no authority to pursue those broader purposes or write
those new laws." Id. Justice Scalia searches out the ordinary meaning of the words used at the time of
the provision's adoption, frequently consulting dictionaries of the era. In fact, Justice Scalia consults
dictionaries more often than any of his colleagues. See Note, Looking It Up: Dictionaries and Statutory
Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1439 n.14, 1441-42 (1994). See also Saby Ghoshray, To Under-
stand Foreign Court Citation: Dissecting Originalism, Dynamism, Romanticism, and Consequentialism,
69 ALB. L. REV. 709, 716-23 (2006) (examining Justice Scalia's originalist jurisprudence).
19. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 463 U.S. 582, 618 (1983) (Marshall. J..
dissenting) (quoting Untied States v. Int'l Boxing Club of N.Y., Inc., 348 U.S. 236, 249 (1955) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting)).
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its applicability to present situations, therefore, is tantamount to unreason-
able usurpation of power.2° Thus, Marshall believed reason must be the
overriding basis through which constitutional decisions based on precedent
must be overruled. According to Marshall, established procedures and con-
stitutional decisions are based on the majority's view of life and the mean-
ing of existence, which do not comport with the divergent life experiences
of minorities. In his address at the Constitution's bicentennial celebration,
Justice Marshall made his view abundantly clear:
I do not believe that the meaning of the Constitution was
forever "fixed" at the Philadelphia Convention. Nor do I
find the wisdom, foresight and sense of justice exhibited by
the framers particularly profound. To the contrary, the gov-
ernment they devised was defective from the start, requiring
several amendments, a civil war, and momentous social
transformation to attain the system of constitutional govern-
ment, and its respect for the individual freedoms and human
rights, that we hold as a fundamental today. When contem-
porary Americans cite "The Constitution," they invoke a
concept that is vastly different from what the framers barely
began to construct two centuries ago.2'
Marshall's strong opposition to established legal process came from his
recognition of the majority's need for hijacking reason as a means to con-
tinue the status quo of suppressing minority's pursuit of equality in the
legal process. Marshall wanted to break such a caste-like system, and envi-
sioned an equality-based legal process that would take into consideration
the trials, tribulations, hopes, and aspirations of people of all social spheres.
As he observed in Dandbridge v. Wiliams:
The extremes to which the Court has gone in dreaming up
rational bases for state regulation in an area may in many
instances be ascribed to a healthy revulsion from the
Court's earlier excesses in using the Constitution to protect
interests that have more than enough power to protect
themselves in the legislative halls. This case, involving the
literally vital no interest of a powerless minority- poor fami-
lies without breadwinners- is far removed from the area of
business regulation, as the Court concedes. 2
In my view, equal protection analysis of this case is not ap-
preciably advanced by the a priori definition of a "right,"
20. See Mark Tushnet, Thurgood Marshall and the Rule of Law, 35 How. L.J. 7. 12 (1991) (noting
Marshall's reasoning for overruling constitutional precedents based on the power of reasoning, not via
power of judicial decision making).
21. THURGOOD MARSHALL: His SPEECHES, WRITINGS, ARGUMENTS. OPINIONS, AND REMINIS-
CENCES 282 (Mark V. Tushnet ed., Lawrence Hill Books 2001).
22. Id. at 323.
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fundamental or otherwise. Rather, concentration must be
placed upon the character of the classification in question,
the relative importance to the individuals in the class dis-
criminated against of the governmental benefits that they do
not receive, and the asserted state interest in support of the
classification.23
Therefore, according to Justice Marshall's jurisprudence, the meaning
of existence must be construed through the mosaic of people's diverging
life experiences. This can be attained by taking into consideration the life
lessons of a wider array of people and putting into context the difficulties
of minorities, all while crafting a legal process that would benefit them all.
If the same yardstick is applied to death penalty jurisprudence, it would
become apparent that the inherent arbitrariness of the death penalty can
never provide equal outcome for all cases. Marshall noted in his remarks at
the Annual dinner in honor of the Judiciary of the American Bar
Association:
I have spoken out often to decry the gross injustices in the
administration of capital punishment in our country. I air
my concerns once again today with the fervent hope that
they reach receptive ears. When in Gregg v. Georgia this
Supreme Court gave its seal of approval to capital punish-
ment, this endorsement was premised on the promise that
capital punishment would be administered with fairness and
justice. Instead, the promise has become a cruel and empty
mockery. If not remedied, the scandalous state of our pre-
sent system of capital punishment will cast a pall of shame
over our society for years to come. We cannot let it
continue.24
If we consider the very finality of the death penalty25 it becomes in-
cumbent upon civilized society to strive for a legal process that can guaran-
tee an equal outcome for the administration of such a procedure. This is
23. Id.
24. Id. at 295.
25. The finality and irreversibility of the death penalty is indoctrinated throughout the post-
Furman era capital jurisprudence in the Supreme Court. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 616-17
(2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that DNA evidence indicating that the convictions of numerous
persons on death row are unreliable is especially alarming since "death is not reversible"); Wainwright
v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 463 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (referencing irrevocability); Spaziano v. Flor-
ida, 468 U.S. 447, 460 n.7 (1984) (same); Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 468 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (same); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (same); Woodson v. North Caro-
lina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (referencing finality); Furman, 408 U.S. at 290 (Brennan, J., concurring)
("[T]he finality of death precludes relief."); Furman, 408 U.S. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring) (finding
death "unique in its total irrevocability"). While giving primacy to procedural safeguards, the Court has
sought to reshape the scope of the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause in
several cases. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306-07 (2002) (holding it cruel and unusual to
execute the mentally retarded because they do not act with the level of moral culpability that character-
izes the most serious adult criminal conduct); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (finding
[VOL. 27:313
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the conception of equality that Marshall worked tirelessly to insert into the
constitutional decision-making process. In my view, this equality emanates
from an emerging conception of constitutional interpretation akin to dy-
namic constitutionalism.
A. Tracing the Constitutional Contours from Brown to Furman
Since his days of representing clients in the segregated South, Justice
Marshall has progressively espoused a constitutional interpretation that
does not restrict the law with rigid, artificial boundaries of procedural hur-
dles. Thus, his judicial philosophy is manifested through his pursuit of ex-
panding the frontier of equal protection jurisprudence for those victimized
by discrimination, in spite of past decisions that rendered them powerless.
Thus, the Marshallian Constitution is animated by the American aspiration
enshrined in the Declaration of Independence and the various Amend-
ments, having the objective to transcend law's temporal barrier of regulat-
ing one group's behavior in favor of another to gain primacy. Since his
judicial philosophy gained maturity through decades of representing Afri-
can-American minorities, Marshall was adept in delineating between for-
mal and substantive justice.26 This is because Marshall worked as a lawyer
at a time when the legal process was still mired in the frozen inequalities
borne out of over-reliance on procedural formality. It requires decades of
relentless work by lawyers like Marshall to expand the legal process to
elicit substantive justice capable of accommodating judicial needs of im-
poverished and disenfranchised minorities.
Marshall understood the Constitution to create a "right of every
American to an equal start in life,"27 a viewpoint that percolated into every
aspect of Marshall's jurisprudence, including his view on death penalty.
While attempting to illuminate Justice Marshall's death penalty jurispru-
dence, I am immediately drawn to the decision in the Furman v. Georgia,
28
which has consistently been heralded as one of the watershed moments of
it cruel and unusual to pronounce death upon a defendant who was under sixteen at the time of his
crime); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982) (finding it cruel and unusual to punish one con-
victed of felony murder but who did not actually commit the murder with death absent a showing that
the defendant possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592
(1977) (holding it cruel and unusual to punish the crime of rape with death).
26. A commentary contends that, "Without question, however, Justice Marshall's career as a
lawyer and judge surpassed all others in securing constitutional access and opportunity for America's
poor and disenfranchised. The legal principles resulting from Thurgood's efforts read as modern Ameri-
can social history: equal voting opportunities for all citizens; freedom from discrimination in housing;
equal educational access for all races; freedom of association; equal access to public transportation and
accommodations; and fairness and freedom from race discrimination in the administration of our crimi-
nal laws." Julius L. Chambers, Thurgood Marshall's Legacy, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1249 (1992) (citing
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (prohibiting exclusion of African Americans in state primary
elections); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (invalidating racially restrictive covenants on prop-
erty); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (prohibiting racial segregation in public schools);
Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (invalidating segregated public beaches and bath-
houses maintained by the state); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940) (prohibiting use of confes-
sions obtained through mental duress or exhaustive questioning)).
27. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 398.
28. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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American Supreme Court jurisprudence on the death penalty.29 However,
Furman was written when Marshall was firmly ensconced in the Supreme
Court, where he may not have arrived but for his tumultuous stop at Brown
v. Board of Education.3" History will forever remember him for his
achievement in this barrier-breaking case because it is Brown-where the
bold ideals of Marshall's equality jurisprudence first saw the light of day-
which nearly two decades later evolved into his abolishment viewpoint in
Furman. While some commentators have viewed Brown as a case about
racial discrimination, and many others viewed it as a case about equal op-
portunities, I view Brown as the harbinger of Marshall's vision of equality,
which would shape the American constitutional jurisprudence for years to
come.
Realizing the goals of Brown remained Marshall's life objective. His
conception of equality was an outgrowth of his experiences of segregation,
and its defining feature was his commitment to equal opportunities. Thus,
where Brown trumpets the right to equal access to education, it transcends
the tunnel vision of education and unravels the principled opposition of all
caste systems, including second class-type citizenship in a systemic frame-
work where a particular class of people is kept below the majority on the
basis of a morally repugnant factor, such as race, sex, or gender. In Mar-
shall's view, "[t]he intent of the fourteenth amendment was to abolish caste
legislation .... When State action has the predictable tendency to entrap
the poor and create a permanent under class, that intent is frustrated."31
Life experience undoubtedly shaped the jurisprudential philosophy of Jus-
tice Marshall in tangible ways, as witnessed in all facets of his
jurisprudence.
B. Rejection of Original Intent to Embracing Dynamic Constitutionalism
Marshall did not believe in the narrow doctrinal interpretation of the
framers' intent, as seen in his view of stare decisis. Marshall examined the
intent of the framers in the fourteenth amendment and questioned their
intention, which implicitly provides evidence for Marshall's adherence to
the evolving nature of the Constitution. Accordingly, he notes:
For a sense of the evolving nature of the Constitution, we
need look no further than the first three words of the docu-
ment's preamble: "We the People." When the Founding Fa-
thers used this phrase in 1787, they did not have in mind a
majority of American citizens. "We the People" included, in
the words of the framers, "the whole Number of free per-
sons." On a matter so basic as the right to vote, for exam-
ple, Negro slaves were excluded, although they were
counted for representational purposes- at three-fifths each.
29. Id. at 240.
30. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
31. Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 469 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Women did not gain the right to vote for over one hundred
and thirty years.32
Therefore, Marshall was not convinced that the Constitution served
the best interest of all people. As a result, he embarked on a crusade to
expand the frontiers of equal protection. He realized that, in order to extri-
cate the law's intention from the frozen inequalities of the framing period,
he needed "a revolution in Constitutional law," which "would entail a
piece of judicial law making which could only be justified only by a philoso-
phy of extreme judicial activism, and this at the hands of a court wherein
several of the justices had repeatedly expressed their judicial activism and
lawmaking by Court-made fiat."3 3 According to Marshall, separate but
equal "could never be equal, that segregation in the public school had a
harmful effect on Negro children."34
This brings us to the query of whether Marshall truly believed in judi-
cial activism or whether he simply hoped to shake the law so "that law may
catch up"3 5 to the evolving societal needs. The answer may be found in
Marshall's vision of precedent. He noted in Payne v. Tennessee,36 "[t]he
overruling of one of this Court's precedents ought to be a matter of great
moment and consequence. Although the doctrine of stare decisis is not an
'inexorable command,' this Court has repeatedly stressed that fidelity to
precedent is fundamental to 'a society governed by the rule of law.' ,3 To
Marshall, stare decisis was "a basic self governing principle within the Judi-
cial Branch, which is entrusted with the sensitive and difficult task of fash-
ioning and preserving a jurisprudential system that is not based upon an
arbitrary discretion."38 In Payne v. Tennessee, Marshall further laid the
groundwork for when the Court could depart from precedential cases with
"special justification[s]."39 To him, "such justifications include the advent of
'subsequent changes of development in the law' that undermine a deci-
sion's rationale, the need 'to bring a decision into agreement with experi-
ence and with facts newly ascertained,' and a showing that a particular
precedent has become a 'detriment to coherence and consistency in the
law.' "40
32. THURGOOD MARSHALL: His SPEECHES, WRITINGS, ARGUMENTS, OPINIONS, AND REMINIS-
CENCES 282 (Mark V. Tushnet ed., Lawrence Hill Books 2001).
33. Nomination of Thurgood Marshall: Hearing Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong.
167 (1961).
34. J.B. Grossman & R.S. Wells, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING 324 (Wi-
ley 1972).
35. See Deborah L. Rhode, Letting the Law Catch Up, 44 STANFORD LAW REVIEW 1259 (1992)
(observing how Marshall's conception of law may be ahead of his time).
36. 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
37. Id. at 848 (Marshall, J. dissenting) (citations omitted).
38. Id. at 848-849 (citing Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989) (quoting
THE FEDERALIST, No. 78, at 480 (A. Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed. 1888)).
39. Id. at 849 (Marshall, J. dissenting) (citations omitted).
40. Id. (citations omitted).
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The pursuit of this coherence and consistency in law has been the
founding tenet of Marshall's jurisprudence. Marshall was profoundly im-
pacted by the travesty of justice in the segregated south while working as
an appellate lawyer defending felony criminal trials that at times lasted less
than a few minutes. While seeing innocent clients being whisked away for a
life behind bars, in the mockery of southern court proceedings, Thurgood
Marshall internalized the deepest wounds in the social fabric. He rightly
observed in Regents of California v. Bakke:
The status of the Negro as property was officially erased by
his emancipation at the end of the Civil War. But the long-
awaited emancipation, while freeing the Negro from slav-
ery, did not bring him citizenship or equality in any mean-
ingful way. Slavery was replaced by a system of "laws which
imposed upon the colored race onerous disabilities and bur-
dens, and curtailed their rights in the pursuit of life, liberty,
and property to such an extent that their freedom was of
little value." Despite the passage of the Thirteenth, Four-
teenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, the Negro was system-
atically denied the rights those Amendments were supposed
to secure. The combined actions and inactions of the State
and Federal Governments maintained Negros in a position
of legal inferiority for another century after the Civil War.4 1
He attempted to bring about a coherency and consistency of law to
help heal those wounds. To him, there was a strong correlation between
the Constitution and the American life, and through the transparent prism
of this relationship, he viewed the Constitution. The very conception of
equality through which he attempted to bring justice found life and sub-
stance in his experience of segregated America. The faces of segregated
America that Marshall saw lived without hope, food, or shelter and, in ad-
dition to being subjected to random and systemic subjugation, were victims
of law. Through this life experience, Marshall attempted to understand the
vulnerabilities of the accused and endeavored to establish safeguards for
their protection through application of a stronger equal protection clause
or, alternatively, a more expanded abstraction of the equal protection
clause.
Therefore, in his expansive view of Fourteenth Amendment jurispru-
dence, we find a conception of equality that is consistent with his fidelity to
the Constitution. His jurisprudence is empowered by his intellectual com-
petency and his decision-making, and engineered by his technical approach
of carefully placing the Court's precedential cases in line with their true
relevance and meaning. This methodology helped Justice Marshall in re-
minding us that law is not an abstract concept removed from the aspiration
41. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 349 (citation omitted).
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of the society it is meant to serve. Thus, to him, the Constitution must con-
stantly interpret and evolve itself to narrow the gap between the goals of
equal justice and the reality of its unequal implementation. As one com-
mentator noted:
Marshall's use of courts and the law has wrought fundamen-
tal change in our politics and society. He espoused princi-
ples and fought for causes of the highest order. His
contributions give us a more thorough understanding of the
political system, and how that system may be made to work
for the "have-nots" as well as the "haves."4
The living constitutionalism of Justice Marshall took shape through his
half-century of work extracting liberty and equality from the fixed original-
ist interpretation of the Constitution. In this journey, he was guided by his
awareness of society's evolving standard of decency and his judicial philos-
ophy with the morality-laden viewpoint. Therefore, to Marshall, the Con-
stitution is a living being-a belief that may be observed through his
remarks:
And so we must be careful, when focusing on the advance
which took place in Philadelphia two centuries ago, that we
not overlook the momentous events which followed, and
thereby lose our proper sense of perspective. Otherwise,
the odds are that for many Americans the bicentennial cele-
bration will be little more than a blind pilgrimage to the
shrine of the original document now stored in a vault in the
National Archives. If we seek, instead, a sensitive under-
standing of the Constitution's inherent defects, and its
promising evolution through 200 years of history, the cele-
bration of the "Miracle at Philadelphia" will, in my view, be
a far more meaningful and humbling experience. We will
see that the true miracle was not the birth of the Constitu-
tion, but its life, a life nurtured through two turbulent centu-
ries of our own making, and a life embodying much good
fortune then was not.
Thus, in this bicentennial year, we may not all participate in
the festivities with flag-waving fervor. Some may more qui-
etly commemorate the suffering, struggle, and sacrifice that
have triumphed over much of what was wrong with the orig-
inal document, and observe the anniversary with hopes not
realized and promises not fulfilled. I plan to celebrate the
42. Lucius J. Barker, Thurgood Marshall, The Law, and the System: Tenets of an Enduring Leg-
acy, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1237, 1246 (1992) (footnote omitted).
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bicentennial of the Constitution as a living document, in-
cluding the Bill of Rights and other amendments protecting
individual freedoms and human rights.
4 3
As I peer through his vision, I submit that Justice Marshall sought out
the framer's intention through an evolving awareness of society's inequality
and disenfranchisement, where the aspirations of all people must be en-
shrined in the equality of law. Thus, for Marshall, constitutional interpreta-
tion of affirmative action "pervert[ed] the intent of the Framers by
substituting abstract equality for the genuine equality the Amendment was
intended to achieve."4 4 Marshall intended to achieve genuine equality,
which was to him seeing a system in which the artificial caste-like societal
barriers would be dismantled, and hopes and aspirations of all humanity
would be upheld.
III. UNDERESTIMATING MARSHALL'S DEATH PENALTY JURISPRUDENCE
THROUGH His VIEWS ON THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
While placing reliance on equality, Marshall developed his death pen-
alty jurisprudence by constructing multiple layers of causation, as evident
in Furman. First, by delving into the archives of historical tradition of the
Eighth Amendment, Marshall established the unconstitutionality of the
death penalty under the cruel and unusual framework.45 Second, by invok-
ing rigid practicality and lack of practicability, Marshall rejected the juridi-
cal value of constitutional precedents for wider application in death penalty
43. THURGOOD MARSHALL: His SPEECHES, WRITINGS, ARGUMENTS, OPINIONS, AND REMINIS-
CENCES 284 (Mark V. Tushnet ed., Lawrence Hill Books 2001).
44. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 398.
45. In Furman, Justice Marshall, indicated that the death penalty violates the constitution be-
cause it is morally unacceptable. The contemporary legal discourse on the death penalty cannot escape
the moral overtones that come with it. While the issue of constitutionality requires defining legal state-
ments, reasoning utilized to arrive at any conclusion can be driven by moral overtones. I argue that
Justice Marshall's principled opposition to the constitutionality of the death penalty is based on moral
values. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 344-45 (commenting that the Eighth Amendment provides insulation
from the cry of vengeance that our "baser selves" would ordinarily demand in response to certain
crimes). See supra note 9 at 343-58. Justice Marshall analyzed the social purposes for the imposition of
the death penalty: retribution, deterrence, recidivism, eugenics, economy, and encouraging guilty pleas
and confessions. Furman, 408 U.S. at 343-58; see also Gregg, 428 U.S. at 236-42 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) (discussing the concepts of retribution and deterrence and their relationship to capital punish-
ment). He systematically considered and eliminated each one of them. First, he eliminated retribution
by itself as a legitimate penological objective as he contended, "[T]he Eighth Amendment itself was
adopted to prevent punishment from becoming synonymous with vengeance." Furman, 408 U.S. at 343
(Marshall, J., concurring). Second, he rejected arguments that the death penalty is a necessary deter-
rent to crime in society. Citing research, and supporting the idea that the death penalty is no more
effective a deterrent than life imprisonment, Justice Marshall asserted that "[i]n light of the massive
amount of evidence before us, I see no alternative but to conclude that capital punishment cannot be
justified on the basis of its deterrent effect." Id. at 345-54. Third. Marshall examined evidence contend-
ing that convicted murderers rarely commit murder again even if they are not sentenced to die. See id.
at 355. Next, Justice Marshall established the economic argument that the death penalty is more expen-
sive than life imprisonment. Id. at 358. Additionally, he felt the leverage used by the invocation of the
death penalty to encourage guilty pleas and confessions is morally repugnant and a violation of the
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. This led him to believe that life imprisonment is
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cases. Third, by analyzing all the attributes of the death penalty, he estab-
lished the extraordinary unfairness, arbitrariness, and discrimination inher-
ent within the capital punishment system. Lastly, Marshall noted that not
only is the death penalty not morally acceptable, but the direction in which
the society is evolving is inconsistent with the continued existence of such a
perverse penalty. Interspersed with this argument is another important
finding. That is, if all the evidence surrounding the death penalty becomes
transparent to the public, their opinion with regard to the death penalty
will change irreversibly. The Furman decision is significant 46 not only be-
cause complex constitutional issues unraveled therein, but because of the
Justices' willingness to embrace morality-laden reasoning within contempo-
rary legal discourse.47
A. Justice Marshall's Evolving Interpretation of Eighth Amendment
in Furman
In Furman, Justice Marshall presented a lengthy opinion that ex-
amined the efficacy of death penalty under the doctrines of retribution,48
penologically sufficient as it "can be used as leverage for bargaining for pleas or confessions in ex-
change either for charges of lesser offenses or recommendations of leniency." Id. at 356.
46. In almost every aspect, Furman's individual decisions represent the Justices' evolution to-
wards a greater understanding of the death penalty's inherent, structural deficiencies. Justice White's
concurrence is of no exception as he pondered over the question whether the death sentence is a cruel,
inhuman, or degrading punishment in the ordinary meaning of these words, or whether it is a cruel,
inhuman, or degrading punishment within the meaning of the Constitution. It, therefore, comes as no
surprise when Justice White said in Furman, "The imposition and execution of the death penalty are
obviously cruel in the dictionary sense." Furman, 408 U.S. at 312 (White, J., concurring). Ironically,
however, the very same Justice was one of the Justices concurring with the holding in Gregg v. Georgia
that capital punishment was not per se cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 207 (White, J.,
concurring). In light of his reversal in Gregg, therefore, we must focus on White's concern about the
constitutionality of the death penalty centering on the widely held social objectives of retribution and
deterrence. With regards to the retributive effects of the death penalty, Justice White points out the
infrequency with which the punishment is carried out, thereby making any legitimate claims of retribu-
tion absurd. Therefore, he concluded, "there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in
which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not." Furman, 408 U.S. at 313
(White, J., concurring). On the other hand, Justice White accepted, on face value, the utilitarian ideals
of the death penalty's deterrent effects on society, but he was skeptical about its explicit utilitarian
impact, as he noted that deterrence, like retribution, is undermined by the infrequency with which the
death penalty is imposed. "[The deterrence of] others by punishing the convicted criminal ... would not
be substantially served where the penalty is so seldom invoked that it ceases to be the credible threat
essential to influence the conduct of others." Id. at 312.
47. See supra note 15.
48. In Furman, Justice Marshall systematically eliminated each of the established objectives of
punishment from his death penalty jurisprudence. See supra note 45. Further, contemporary research
supports Marshall's view as retribution serving no penological purposes in light of research. Author
Gerhard 0. W. Mueller notes:
Closely related to the aim of vindication is the aim of retribution. But the addressee of retribu-
tion is a different one. It is not the law itself; it is, rather, the organized group whose rules have
been violated and whose sense of security has been disturbed. This society includes, of course,
the direct victim of the wrong (or his immediate relatives, in case of a homicide). Perhaps, at
one time the demand of retribution was purely that of the direct victim of the homicide,
namely the family. But as the law community grew from the family to the state or nation, it
was that larger body which became the recipient of the retribution.
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deterrence, 49 and recidivism,5" while flushing out both the economics and
the political processes underlying the punishment. Reviewing Marshall's
opinion in Furman, I see two relationships that the Justice holds as guiding
principles for rendering the death penalty unconstitutional: first, the rela-
tionship between the death penalty and our society's self-respect; 51 and sec-
ond, the relationship between the death penalty and our society's sense of
morality512 Marshall's principled opposition to the death penalty, there-
fore, must be viewed through a spectrum of constitutional jurisprudence,
Gerhard 0. W. Mueller, THE TASKS OF PENOLOGY: A SYMPOSIUM ON PRISONS AND CORRECTIONAL
LAW 57 (Harvey S. Perlman & Thomas B. Allington eds., University of Nebraska Press 1969). Continu-
ing on his theme of retribution, the author called it bankrupt on two grounds, "'Getting even' is not a
very mature motive" and "the second reason why it appears to me that retaliation is not a proper
ground for imprisonment is that we are not consistent." Id. "We could be much more drastic in the
severity of imprisonment .... [w]e no longer whip felons . . . [t]he public conscience has grown too
tender to permit drastic punishments." Id. Other authors note the continued value of retribution:
The currently growing realization of many criminologists that the normative barrier against
prescribed behavior (including crime) is strongly linked with the depth of the internalization
of norms and values by a certain person. The extent to which the non- (or anti-) criminal
norms have been incorporated into the personality of a certain person, i.e., his being morally
orientated may largely determine his chances of becoming an offender and his subsequent
'reformation' or his becoming a recidivist.
See id. at 58-59 (citation omitted). See generally Note, The Moral Dilemma of Penal Treatment, 1963
JURID. REV. 135, 138.
49. See Justice Marshall's view on deterrence, supra note 45.
50. See Justice Marshall's view on recidivism, supra note 45.
51. Although Justice Marshall questioned the society's self-respect in trying to establish that reli-
ance on the death penalty as a punishment mechanism is not consistent with upholding a mature soci-
ety's self-respect, contemporary research paints a rather grim picture. Against the 10-year death
penalty moratorium, new death penalty laws ushered in more aggressive death penalty jurisprudence.
On January 17, 1977, Gary Gilmore faced his firing squad by proclaiming, "Let's do it." He became the
first prisoner since 1976 to be executed under the new death penalty laws. Whereas, Kenneth Boyd, on
December 2, 2005, became the 1000th person to be executed since the death penalty was reintroduced.
See Recent Legal History of the Death Penalty in America: Executions Resume, http://us-
govinfo.about.com/library/weeklyfbldeathpenalty.htm; see also Bureau of Justice Statistics, Attitudes
Toward the Death Penalty for Persons Convicted of Murder, United States, Selected Years 1953-2006,
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t2512006.pdf (demonstrating society's acceptance of capital
punishment). Numerous opinion polls have been conducted to gauge the public position on the death
penalty. Consistently, polls dictate that a majority of the American public supports the death penalty.
Consider the following: In May 2005, a Gallup poll stated that 74% of respondees are in "favor of the
death penalty for a person convicted of murder." Public Opinion and the Death Penalty,Public Opin-
ion Polls, http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/html/death/opinion.htm. The poll highlights that when life
imprisonment without parole was given as an option instead of the death penalty, 56% supported the
death penalty, and 39% supported life imprisonment. Id. Again, in May 2003, 37% of Gallup poll
respondees chose "Eye for an Eye Punishment" as the reason they favor the death penalty. Id. This
same poll noted that 61% of respondees in May of 2005 believe the "death penalty is applied fairly in
this country." Id.
52. The normative ethical perspective of moral equity was originated by Aristotle, and defined
by Rawls: "All social primary goods-liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-
respect-are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is to
the advantage of the least favored." JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 303 (Harvard University
Press 1971). Here, Rawlism legal justice attempts to bring equitable application across all constituents,
but law's inherent deficiencies sometimes make equitable application untenable, the same way
Furman's prescribed consistency in death sentences has become untenable in the long run. This, there-
fore, calls for developing actions that can correct the defects in moral consistency and trace a path of
moral contour along the rigid lines of law. This is what Aristotle described as moral contour formation.
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which straddles a dual rationality of Justice Marshall's death penalty juris-
prudence. In this dual rationality, I first expand on the constitutional con-
tour Marshall traversed in his illumination of the Eighth Amendment's
"cruel and unusual punishment" doctrine. Second, I bring in Marshall's
morality-laced jurisprudential philosophy that emerged from his view on
society's evolving standards of decency.53 Although the Court's decision in
Gregg overturned Furman, Justice Marshall remained convinced that the
Furman findings remained intact.
Marshall's problem with the death penalty emanates from the funda-
mental disconnect between the genuine equality sought by law and the ac-
tual implementation of legal principles. During his three decades on the
Supreme Court, through his dissents and concurring opinions, Marshall at-
tempted to place the abolishment of the death penalty on a firmer
ground.54 Perhaps in some aspects, his views were clearly ahead of his
time. But he believed he was doing the right thing and was waiting for the
"law to catch up." So fundamental was his belief in this cause that his
opinion in Furman can be seen as a spirited assault on the constitutionality
of the death penalty. Under the Eighth Amendment's "cruel and unusual"
doctrine, Marshall proceeded in multiple layers as if he was building a cas-
tle brick by brick.
"Before Marshall went on his substantive expos6 of the historical tra-
dition of the Eighth Amendment, he brought in the relevance of society's
attitude by drawing from his playbook of dynamic constitutionalism. On
this, he asked, "the question is not whether we condone rape or murder,
for surely we do not; it is whether capital punishment is 'a punishment no
longer consistent with our own self-respect and, therefore, violative of the
Eighth Amendment."55
See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 140-43 (Martin Ostwald trans., Macmillan Publishing Com-
pany 1962) (opining that law is not always equitable and this is why not all things are determined by
law).
53. Aristotle, supra note 52 at 101. There exist books and articles further discussing the historical
context of the addition of "evolving standards of decency" into the case opinions. See ED CRAY, CHIEF
JUSTICE: A BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN 359 (Simon & Schuster 1997) (describing the standard); see
also Charles Hobson, Atkins v. Virginia, Federalism, and Judicial Review, 11 WIDENER L. REV. 23,
39-41 (2004) (discussing "evolving standards of decency"). The phrase "evolving standards of decency"
is taken from the opinion of the Chief Justice Warren in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958). Speaking
for the Court, the Chief developed the measure of permissible punishment under the Eighth Amend-
ment of the Constitution by referencing "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society." Id. at 101. Since then, various Justices have used this as the guiding principle for
deciding claims of Cruel and Unusual Punishment. Sometimes "evolving standards of decency" has
been used synonymously with "contemporary standards of decency." For example, in People v. Ander-
son, 493 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1972), superseded by statute, CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (Deering 1985), Chief
Justice Wright, speaking for the Supreme Court of California, said, "Public acceptance of capital pun-
ishment is a relevant but not controlling factor in assessing whether it is consonant with contemporary
standards of decency." Id. at 893. In this context, Justice Scalia's comment in Thompson v. Oklahoma,
487 U.S. 815 (1988), is noteworthy: "Of course, the risk of assessing evolving standards is that it is all
too easy to believe that evolution has culminated in one's own views." Id. at 865 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
54. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 465.
55. Furman, 408 U.S. at 315 (Marshall, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
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Marshall believed that the unconstitutionality of the death penalty
flowed from the reasoning of being excessive, which serves no valid legisla-
tive purpose. He brought in the "evolving standards of decency" doctrine,
long introduced in constitutional jurisprudence by Justice Warren,56 and
championed by other Justices5 7 in later years, by connecting this punish-
ment's cruel and unusual nature with popular sentiment. While setting
aside the cruelty element, Marshall grafted an unusual element in the argu-
ment by showing the larger society's distaste for this punishment mecha-
nism. In my view, Marshall believed that if he successfully established that
society in general finds this punishment so distasteful and unusual, then by
virtue of the Constitution's Eighth Amendment's prohibition, it would be
invalidated. Perhaps Marshall highlighted this issue of popular sentiment in
an attempt to extricate the Constitution from the frozen inequality of the
eighteenth century viewpoint and give life to substantive ideals in the
twenty-first century. Moreover, I view this as the Justice's attempt to issue
a climatic jolt to the individual members of society, who may have been
under the influence of a false consciousness. 58
In my view, what Justice Marshall truly sought was to point out the
flagrant inequality and the stark disenfranchisement that percolated
throughout the decades prior to his coming to the Court. Looking back at
the history of the death penalty, it has obviously been implemented dispro-
portionately among minorities, against a societal framework that is
predominantly formed and controlled by the majority's norms.59 So, if a
minority is at the receiving end of the ultimate punishment, can we truly
56. See Cray, supra note 53.
57. Id.
58. I have discussed this concept of false consciousness and collective consciousness in an upcom-
ing work. See SABY GHOSHRAY, SYMMETRY, RATIONALITY AND CONSCIOUSNESS: REVISITING
MARCUSEAN REPRESSION IN AMERICA'S WAR ON TERROR (forthcoming).
59. While tracing the genesis of death penalty jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, I assert here
that, the views taken by several Justices in some of the significant post-Furman era cases, in which their
opinions, either in concurrence or in dissent, have significantly shaped the moral contours of the Court.
In my view, sustained dissent by two Justices-Brennan and Marshall-in capital penalty cases, pro-
duced a rich body of legal literature where the issues of morality and ethics have shaken the very core
of the doctrine of stare decisis. These Justices' relentless unwillingness to accommodate the views of the
majority signals a clarion call to change the law in a certain direction within the capital penalty jurispru-
dence. In a direct confrontation to Justice Brandeis' timeless observation, "[i]t is usually more impor-
tant that a rule of law be settled than that it be settled right." Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 42
(1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled in part by People of State of California v. Thompson, 313
U.S. 109 (1941). The continued dissents by Justices in cases upholding the death penalty perhaps sig-
nals that the law of capital punishment is far from being settled. I would argue that this abiding convic-
tion to settle the law correctly drove Justices to dissent in landmark cases. See generally William J.
Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTING L.J., 427 (1986) (discussing the relevance of dissenting
opinions). I have shown elsewhere that, Justices Brennan and Marshall have repeatedly questioned the
morality of the death penalty in their dissents, which leads us to explore the larger question as to whose
morality is being upheld in those majority decisions. See Dr. Saby Ghoshray, Tracing the Moral Con-
tours of the Evolving Standards of Decency: The Supreme Court's Capital Jurisprudence Post-Roper, 45
J. CATH. LEGAL STUD., 561-629 (2007). The death penalty gets complicated while viewing it through the
prism of morality. In any morality-laden discourse, the inevitable issue before the scholars is to answer
the focused question of whose morality the legal discourse should doctrinalize. In this context, Profes-
sor Perry notes: "The penetration of legal discourse by moral discourse is not surprising. Moral contro-
versy is often at the center of legal controversy; in particular, controversy about whether one or another
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call it justice? Is there any credence to the majority's view? That is why
Justice Marshall viewed this as a morality issue, and he attempted to cor-
rect the moral compass of the Court by posing some poignant questions: "If
retribution alone could serve as a justification for any particular penalty
then all the penalties selected by the legislature would by definition be ac-
ceptable means for society's abrogation of a particular act."
60
Clearly, Justice Marshall challenged us to dig deeper in our collective
consciousness, to bring out that inherent humanity, and to recognize the
morality of vengeance.61 To him, by recognizing this morality of vengeance,
society would allow for the correction of the moral compass by carefully
eliminating the scope of vengeance from the punishment mechanism. Ac-
cording to him, recognizing this will not only correct the moral compass,
but realign both the penological objectives and the fundamentals to death
penalty jurisprudence into a more value-centric punishment mechanism. In
this context, he provides us with the qualitative guidelines found in the
Eighth Amendment, clearly warning us against society's debasement from
erroneous implementation of vengeance: "[t]he Eighth Amendment is our
insulation from our baser selves. The "cruel and usual" language limits the
avenues through which vengeance may be channeled. Were this not so, the
language would be empty and a return to the rack and other tortures would
be possible in a given case. "62
Marshall's morality-centric jurisprudence is manifested in his attempt
to awaken society to the moral vulnerability of the death penalty. First,
morality is intricately related to the maturation of a society by traversing a
corrected moral compass. A society is understood to follow a path of evolv-
ing enlightenment; in this path, a society is expected to do the right thing,
and to Marshall, that path would be establishing unusual nature of the
death penalty. Second, by connecting moral vulnerability with the evolu-
tion of the society, he sought to create a continuous contour where the
death penalty must be declared unconstitutional on moral grounds, for
practice (abortion, homosexual sexual conduct, physician-assisted suicide, etc.) is, at least in some in-
stances ... legally permissible." Michael J. Perry, What Is "Morality" Anyway? 45 Vill. L. Rev. 69, 70
(2000). See also id. at 72-74 (explaining that the sword of moral discourse can cut both ways into a legal
doctrine's development, as opposing sides lobby for either banning or upholding the relevant law in
question). This article, therefore, attempts to navigate this issue by first tracing a moral contour involv-
ing death penalty and then proposing a robust framework supporting the abolitionist viewpoint that can
transcend narrow doctrinal considerations.
60. See Furman, supra note 9, at 344 ("At times a cry is heard that morality requires
vengeance.").
61. See JOYCELYN M. Pollock, ETHICS IN CRIME AND JUSTICE: DILEMMAS AND DECISIONS 59
(Wadsworth Publishing Company 2d ed. 1994). Further outlined by authors Allen and Simonson is the
historical relevance of vengeance:
The idea of vengeance is not new, nor is it unique in any fashion. Roughly four thousand years
ago the Hammurabi Code (1750 B.C.) prescribed specific punishments for Babylonia. Exam-
ples include: If a man knocks out the tooth of a man of his own rank, they shall knock out his
tooth. If a son strikes his father, they shall cut off his fingers. If a man destroys the eye of
another man, they shall destroy his eye. If a man of higher social rank destroys the eye of a
man of lower rank, the man shall pay a fine.
Harry. E. Allen & Clifford E. Simonsen, Corrections in America 6 (5th ed. 1989).
62. See Furman, supra note 9, at 344.
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"people who [are] fully informed as to the purpose of the [death] penalty
and its liabilities would find the penalty shocking, unjust, and unaccept-
able."'6 3 Therefore, not only does he utilize moral vulnerability, he brings in
the "shock the conscience test"64 and connects both with a sense of justice.
Finally, Justice Marshall brought forth a new interpretative dimension
of the Eighth Amendment jurisprudence by melding morality-laced dis-
course into judicial decision-making. In this interpretation, Marshall at-
tempted to expand the judicial interpretation of death penalty much
further. His ingenious way of connecting Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
with society's moral compass was not only brilliant but will forever be an
enduring principle in death penalty jurisprudence. The interpretation of the
Eighth Amendment is predicated on society's evolving standards. Marshall
provided a deterministic paradigm for identifying whether the cruel and
unusual punishment doctrine of the Eighth Amendment has been violated
by introducing a transparent mechanism to measure the threshold of the
evolving standard of decency. Although this transparent mechanism cannot
eradicate the cloud of arbitrariness that continues to hover over the death
penalty jurisprudence, at least this can provide an additional interpretative
gloss on the individual elements of the Eighth Amendment. However, the
issue before us is: could the majority of the Justices view the Eighth
Amendment interpretation as such? Until and unless the majority believes
in an expanded conception of the Eighth Amendment following the line of
reasoning espoused by Marshall, the "death-is-different"'65 principle may
never materialize.
63. Id. at 361.
64. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). The 'shock the conscience' test was popu-
larized after Justice Felix Frankfurter established the test, based on the Fourteenth Amendment's pro-
hibition against states depriving any person of "life, liberty, or property without due process of law."
This test attempts to determine whether an actionlbehavior falls outside the standards of civilized de-
cency. Id. at 173. The basic premise of the "shock the conscience" test for certain rights resides in the
premise that certain rights are so inherent, so fundamental in the current conception of our human
existence that any abrogation or explicit denial of such a right must be seen as shocking the conscience.
Id. at 169. Not all rights are fundamental rights. Nor are they all human rights. Rights can be envisioned
or derivative of existing rights. In order for a right to qualify as a fundamental human right, the right
must pass the "shock the conscience" test. Id. at 172.
65. In addition to Furman, the qualitative difference of the death penalty has been established
throughout the post-Furman era. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 337 (2002) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (arguing that the majority opinion holding it cruel and unusual to punish retarded persons with
death is the "pinnacle of... death-is-different jurisprudence"); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 605-06
(2002) (noting that "there is no doubt that death is different") (internal quotation marks omitted);
Ring, 536 U.S. at 614 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("[T]he Eighth Amendment requires States to apply
special procedural safeguards when they seek the death penalty.") (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 153 (1976)); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 340 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("It hardly
needs reiteration that this Court has consistently acknowledged the uniqueness of the punishment of
death."); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 463 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (referencing that "the
death penalty is qualitatively different" from other punishments) (citing Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S.
447, 468 (1984)); Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 459 (noting the Court's prior "recognition of the 'qualitative
difference' of the death penalty") (citing Furman 408 U.S. 238)); Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 468 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[T]he death penalty is qualitatively different... and hence
must be accompanied by unique safeguards .... ); Locket v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (holding
that the death penalty is "qualitatively different") (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,
305 (1976)); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) (finding that the
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IV. CONCLUSION
In this article, I have spotlighted a narrow segment of Justice Mar-
shall's jurisprudence: his philosophy on the death penalty. While providing
a different interpretative gloss, I have established that Marshall's death
penalty jurisprudence emanated from his expansive conception of equality,
anchored within a Constitution, which ensures equitable legal outcome for
all humanity. In his pursuit, Marshall, whose substantive jurisprudence was
committed to elevate the asymmetrical social conditions of the disen-
franchised minority, was guided by a compassionate legal process. I have
shown that these compassionate ideals of law do not flow from Marshalls's
morality-centric jurisprudence, nor are they found within the textual mean-
ing of the Constitution. Additionally, they cannot be gleaned from legal
precedents. Instead, I posit that the expanded ideals and the wider abstrac-
tion of law that Marshall brought forth in both the contemporary politics
and society could only emanate from his conception of a living Constitu-
tion. Therefore, his rejection of constitutional precedents is no accident.
Rather, Marshall formed his judicial philosophy on the basis of his life's
experiences, where he fought relentlessly to alleviate inequality and caste-
like barriers within the judicial process.
Through his principled rejection of the death penalty, Marshall es-
poused a viewpoint of the justice mechanism as a reflection of society's
inner core. To him, law must evolve, and the trajectory of that evolution
must trace the moral contours of a civilized society. Unfortunately, contem-
porary judicial interpretation is shaped by the political process, in which
"penalty of death is different in kind from any other punishment" and emphasizing its "uniqueness");
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) ("[T]he penalty of death is
qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long.").
The finality and irreversibility of the death penalty is indoctrinated throughout the post-Furman
era capital jurisprudence in the Supreme Court. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 616-17 (Breyer, J., concurring)
(noting that DNA evidence indicating that the convictions of numerous persons on death row are unre-
liable is especially alarming since "death is not reversible"); Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 463 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (referencing irrevocability) (quoting Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 468)); Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 460
n.7 (same) (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187)); Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 468 (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (same); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens,
JJ.) (same) (citing Furman, 408 U.S. at 286-291)); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305 (joint opinion of Stewart,
Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) (referencing finality); Furman, 408 U.S. at 290 (Brennan, J., concurring)
(-[T]he finality of death precludes relief."); id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring) (finding death "unique in
its total irrevocability"). While giving primacy to procedural safeguards, the Court has sought to
reshape the scope of the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause in several cases.
See, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 306 (holding it cruel and unusual to execute the mentally retarded because
they do not act with the level of moral culpability that characterizes the most serious adult criminal
conduct); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (finding it cruel and unusual to pronounce
death upon a defendant who was under sixteen at the time of his crime); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.
782, 789-93 (1982) (finding it cruel and unusual to punish felony murder with death absent a showing
that the defendant possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592
(1977) (holding it cruel and unusual to punish the crime of rape with death). In this same context,
Professor Abramson believes, "In the words of Justice Stevens, the death sentence 'is the one punish-
ment that cannot be prescribed by a rule of law as judges normally understand rules,' but is instead an
ethical judgment expressing the conscience of the community as to whether 'an individual has lost his
moral entitlement to live.' " See Jeffrey Abramson, Death-Is-Different Jurisprudence and the Role of the
Capital Jury, 2 OHIo ST. J. CRIM. L. 117, 119 (2004) (quoting Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 469 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
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constitutional opinions are rendered via a game-theoretic, bargain-centric
mechanism interested more in coalition-building in the Court than in ren-
dering the most equitable justice. To Marshall, this majority view, more
often than not, subsumes the cries of injustice, as manifested in his count-
less dissents-the hallmark of his three decades on the Court. To me, Jus-
tice Marshall was the conscience of a judiciary that at times was lost in a
confused conundrum, borne out of a conflict between fidelity to the politi-
cal process and an ethical obligation to disperse equitable justice. However,
through his relentless dissents, Marshall was able to impart within the
American constitutional jurisprudence a broader expanse of ideals of the
conception of justice that surely will reverberate for a long time.
As I review Marshall's death penalty jurisprudence, I am emboldened
by his morality-centric decision-making process in which he reminded us of
the death penalty's debased dimension by invoking society's lofty ideals
and humanity's elevated inner sanctum. Through his clarion call jolting hu-
manity out of its false consciousness, Marshall prompted us to look within
our inner selves and to attempt to elevate our threshold of morality. Ac-
cording to Marshall, this morality would be sufficient to guide society to
recognize that state-sanctioned killing would only devolve humanity to-
wards accepting their debased selves. Sadly, in a world where violence con-
tinues to mount, that clarion call remains unanswered as we continue to
execute humans via state machinery.
Finally, more than two decades have passed since the conscience of the
Supreme Court has departed. At a time when Justices routinely uphold the
constitutionality of torture, our society watches without blinking at the bar-
baric execution of 76-year-old infirm individuals. Without doubt, his con-
science is very much needed within the Court. Although that conscience is
gone, I must end with hope; the hope that springs from Marshall's past
deeds and remains within our existence. His words continue to echo the
conception of equality, his dissents give us hope for equality in the legal
process, as he reminded us:
What is striking is the role legal principles have played
throughout America's history in determining the condition
of Negroes. They were enslaved by law, emancipated by
law, disenfranchised and segregated by law; and, finally,
they have begun to win equality by law. Along the way,
new constitutional principles have emerged to meet the
challenges of a changing society. The progress has been
dramatic, and it will continue.66
66. See Marshall, supra note 21, at 284.
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